Introduction
The Brexit vote in the UK, according to Andrés Rodríguez-Pose (2018) , is an instance of the revenge of the 'places that don't matter'. This expression of discontent from places at the sharp end of rising social and spatial inequalities has fostered the rapid rise of populism that is challenging the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy. This paper considers the problems of these so-called 'left-behind' places -typically former industrial regions. Such places figured prominently not just among those that voted leave in the Brexit referendum in the UK, but also among those who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 in the US, and for Marine Le Pen in 2017 in France in their respective presidential elections. In this context, this paper's aims are fourfold. First, we outline the political economy of 'leftbehind' regions. Second, we offer a critical account of recent efforts to 'regenerate' deindustrialised regions. Third, we describe new policy prescriptions for 'leftbehind' regions attracting the attention of policymakers. Finally, the politics of local and regional economic development are considered, including the kinds of institutions are required to affect a new economic future in such disadvantaged places 1 .
The regional political economy of deindustrialisation Beatty and Fothergill (2018) estimate that 16 million people live in the former industrial regions of the UKalmost one quarter of the national population. While these regions have shared in the rise in employment in recent years, growth rates in London and other cities have been three times faster. Despite prolonged and farreaching deindustrialisation, these places still have a higher than national average share of industrial jobs, lack white-collar and graduate- (Plümper et al. 2018) . Mordechai et al. (2018) have identified higher opioid prescription rates in the north of England and in areas of greater social deprivation. The highest incidence of relative urban decline is primarily located in Northern England (Pike et al. 2016 LG in Newport and Siemens on Tyneside withdrew their investments shortly after their high-profile openings. The fragility of such branch plant economies is longestablished (Pike, et al. 2017) . Stirrings of economic nationalism and even 'deglobalisation', have rendered strategies based upon the continued attraction of flows mobile manufacturing investment more difficult for UK regions, especially in the uncertain context of Brexit and future trading relations. Enterprise policy typically stimulated unsustainable market entry by short-lived businesses, displacing incumbents (Storey et al. 2008) , and encouraged 'reluctant entrepreneurs' into starting low-value service enterprises (Turner 2003) . While rising productivity means existing employers are likely to shed workers to remain competitive; indeed, some consider the remaining jobs in 'left-behind' places especially vulnerable to automation (Centre for Cities, 2018).
In this context, there has been a search for new approaches to economic development. Currently, a powerful orthodoxy suggests that cities offer productivity and growth premiums because they generate agglomeration economies through their scale, density and diversity. In this way, London acts as the dynamo that powers the UK economy, through its financial, digital and knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) and provides an economic development model to which other places should aspire. The recent growth of Manchester, based on the expansion of services and property development, has been presented as the model for other city-regions (Moran, et al., 2018) .
Public policy now aims to facilitate the further growth of large cities -typically by easing planning restrictions to allow more development. Recently, city-centre regeneration has acted as a proxy for industrial strategy (Berry, 2018) . The Northern Powerhouse, for instance, operates primarily as a brand for the marketing of Northern England for investment in residential and commercial real estate, infrastructure, and, to a lesser extent, advanced manufacturing, R&D, and culture (Lee, 2017 ). This development model lies behind the recent push to create 'metromayors' in city-regions as the government's preferred form of devolution based upon matching decision-making with 'functional economic areas' (Moran et al., 2018 (Glaeser, 2013) . Such interpretations underline views that see efforts to revive lagging industrial regions as having failed and being counterproductive; better to enable migration to London (or other large cities) where more productive jobs are plentiful (e.g. Leunig, 2008) .
The limits of 'regeneration'
Reeves (2018: 30) has cogently summarised the limits of recent policies: "[I]ndustrial strategy has tended to concentrate on cities as engines of growth, on property development, technological innovation and the high-productivity trading sectors. This approach to economic growth neglects middle-and low-paid workers in the low-productivity, nontraded sectors, as well as the civic infrastructure required to develop research and innovation across the whole economy. It also tends to exclude rural areas and towns from the very wealthcreating activity it is promoting."
McCann (2016) (McCann, 2016) . Although the gap between major cities and their regional hinterlands has widened, much of the growth, even in relative success stories such as Manchester, has been in low productivity, low wage sectors rather than KIBS. Moreover, with their greater social needs and higher costs of service provision, local authorities in 'leftbehind' places have borne the brunt of austerity since 2010 (Bounds, 2017) . Stiglitz, 2015) . In the US, the Brookings Institution has argued that places disconnected from economic opportunity "may hold back collective growth and threaten the social fabric on which a healthy democracy depends" (Berube and Murray, 2018: 2) . Growing urban and regional divides are one expression of this. But, policy-makers' continued faith in agglomeration and denselydeveloped cities as the route to economic development is being challenged by research suggesting that large cities are not always the most dynamic engines of growth (Dijkstra et al., 2013) . In the UK, the productivity growth of southern servicebased cities has been modest, slowing any increases in national average productivity, despite higher levels of skills and the presence of KIBS. Some smaller and medium-sized cities have outperformed larger cities (Martin et al. 2018) . Indeed, the OECD has cautioned against only focusing on the largest 'core cities', suggesting: "Larger cities create benefits, but as benefits grow, so do 'agglomeration costs' ... costs and benefits increase in parallel, reducing the pull of larger cities … a wellconnected 'megaregion' with rural areas and a network of smaller, but well-connected cities, could provide agglomeration benefits while limiting the costs from congestion and densification" (OECD, 2018: 86) .
Given this geographical differentiation of economic conditions, place-based approaches offer a novel approach to local and regional economic development.
Such approaches aim to release untapped potential in economically lagging places by empowering local stakeholders to maximise their skills, talent and capabilities in ways that enhance economic performance and potential (Barca et al. 2012) .
Such strategies tailor their mix of policies to local conditions, improving opportunities for citizens and workers wherever they live through a combination of targeted development strategies and institutional and capability improvements (Immarino et al., 2018) . The World Bank calls for regions to act as the architects and implementers of their own programmes to address their locally unique capabilities and challenges, while acknowledging this will require more intensive, onthe-ground support, including technical assistance and capacity building at the regional and the local level (Farole, et al, 2018: 11) . Conventional approaches to economic development that focus solely on increasing economic growth have had limited impact in 'left-behind' places. Economic growth has typically not translated into rising living standards, with households which have seen declining real incomes and people trapped in low value and poorly paid jobs that sustain in-work poverty, suggesting the need for more rounded forms of development that focus on human wellbeing (Stiglitz et al., 2010 ).
The pursuit of major inward investments, development of KIBS or advanced manufacturing are unlikely to create inclusive growth in 'left-behind' places (Lee, 2018 (Pike et al. 2017) . Moreover, 87% of the growth in the value of housing over the 10 years to 2017 occurred there (Savills, 2018) . Quantitative easing and bank bailouts have underpinned asset appreciation, and this further benefitted London and the south (Gordon, 2016) . A land value tax, which targets immobile assets and unearned gains in wealth, although politically difficult to achieve, with explicit fiscal equalisation measures, would lie at the heart of efforts to achieve more regionally balanced economy (Ryan-Collins, et al. 2017 ).
Allowing the continued and 'managed decline' of leftbehind communities or exhorting their residents to migrate (Leunig, 2008) are a political and moral dead end. People have a low propensity to move out of such places for a range understandable reasons, including the difficulties of relocating from low value and weak to high value and strong housing markets and the social pull of valued community ties (Rodriguez-Pose, 2018; Sandbu, 2016) . Indeed, such strong social bonds are one of the defining characteristics of former industrial regions and the loss of identity associated the disappearance of old ways of life continues to shape economic, social, political and cultural attitudes and behaviours in such places (Warren, 2018) . This suggests the case for a new 'economics of belonging' (Sandbu, 2018 ) that recognises the value of these relationships and builds upon them to create new forms of economic activity.
Endnotes
1. Jennings and Stoker (2016) identify a distinction between 'two Englands' consisting of 'cosmopolitan' and 'backwater' places. Their focus is on places in southern England, symbolised by the divide between cosmopolitan Cambridge and the backwater, former seaside resort, Clacton. The focus here is on former industrial regions.
